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Abstract: The article comments on a recent decision of the BGH (German Supreme Court) regar-
ding the recognition of a “judgment of paternity” which was obtained by a German couple in California 
after concluding an agreement with a surrogate mother in California. The German law is strictly oppo-
sed to any form of surrogacy; therefore earlier courts had usually denied recognition in similar cases 
for ordre public reasons. In this decision the BGH decided on the matter for the first time. Contrary to 
the lower instance courts she recognized the “judgment” after a careful weightening of all rights and 
policies involved. He came to the conclusion that the preponderant interests of the child outweighed 
all interest opposing a denial of recognition. The article describes the legal background of surrogacy 
and cross-border parenthood law. Afterwards, it explains the decision and which controversial issues 
the BGH decided. Finally it gives an outlook on those questions the BGH did not decide and how she 
probably will decide if she keeps her line of argument.  
Key Words: surrogacy, German private international law of parentage, recognition of foreign 
judgments under German law. 
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel kommentiert die Entscheidung des BGH zur Anerkennung 
eines “judgment of paternity”, welches ein kalifornisches Gericht zugunsten eines deutschen Pärchens 
ausgesprochen hatte. Diese hatten vorher eine Leihmutterschaftsvereinbarung in Kalifornien nach ka-
lifornischem Recht abgeschlossen. Das deutsche Recht lehnt alle Formen der Leihmutterschaft ab. Die 
unterinstanzlichen Gerichte versagten daher regelmäßig eine Anerkennung als ordre public-widrig. 
Der BGH entschied das erste Mal über die Frage. Er nahm eine Abwägung aller in Frage stehenden 
Rechte und Interessen vor und sprach sich – im Gegensatz zu den meisten unterinstanzlichen Gerich-
ten – für eine Anerkennung aus. Ausschlaggegebend waren die Interessen des Kindes, die alle übrigen 
Interessen und Rechte überwogen. Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die deutsche Rechtslage, 
erläutert dann die Entscheidung und gibt anschließend einen Ausblick bezogen auf die Fragen, welche 
der BGH offen ließ.
Stichwörter: Leihmutterschaft, deutsches Abstammungskollisionsrecht, Anerkennung ausländis-
cher Entscheidungen im deutschen Recht
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Rights. 4. Cross-Border Questions.  IV. The Decision. 1. Applicability of Sec. 108 Para. 1 FamFG. 
2. “Inverse” Jurisdiction of the Californian Court (Sec. 109 Para. 1 Lit. a). 3. The Public Policy 
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I. Introduction
1. In December 2014 the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof - BGH) decided 
an issue which in similar constellations had and has been pending in several courts within the last years 
and has also produced a vast amount of legal studies and literature in several jurisdictions1: The deter-
mination of parentage in questions of cross-border surrogacy.2 
2. A surrogate mother is a woman who carries a child for another person or couple (so-called 
“intended parents”) with the intention to hand it over after the birth and reject any rights as a mother. 
Artificial reproductive medicine as in vitro fertilization (IVF) and intracytoplasmic sperm injection al-
low the creation of a child which is not genetically linked to the surrogate mother but may be genetically 
linked to one or both intended parents. Some countries have legalized surrogacy, some restricted or for-
bidden.3 In consequence, childless couples from countries forbidding surrogacy went to countries with 
a less restricted approach. Legal questions occurred regarding parentage when they afterward returned 
to their country with a so-created child (and subsequently regarding nationality in countries following 
the ius sanguinis-principle).
3. As in several other jurisdictions, the German substantial law is strictly opposed to surrogacy. 
German courts had always shown a strong tendency to defend that national policy. The majority had 
declared every parentage allocation as contrary to the German public policy which was based on the 
undertaking of surrogacy, even though lawful in the territory where it was undertaken. 4 This attitude 
changed in the aforementioned decision.
4. After a short description of the facts (II.), this article will explain the legal backgrounds (II), 
the court’s reasoning (IV) and possible further consequences (V.). It will close with a short outlook on 
surrogacy cases in Germany.
II. The Facts
 
5. The intended parents, a male same-sex couple living in a registered partnership under German 
law, concluded a surrogacy contract in California according to Californian law. The surrogate mother, 
an unmarried woman, gave birth to a child genetically related to one of the intended fathers. Genetic 
mother was an anonymous egg donor. A Californian Court issued a “judgment of paternity” declaring 
both intended parents as legal parents. Earlier, the genetic father had recognized his fatherhood and the 
surrogate mother had made a declaration that she rejected all rights or obligations regarding motherhood 
to the child.5 The couple and the child returned to Germany and requested the birth and parentage regis-
tration in the civil status registry. The public registrar refused the registration declaring such a parentage 
1 E.g. country reports in K. TrimminGS/P. BeaumonT (ed.), International Surrogacy Arrangements, Oxford, Hart, 2013; 
L. BruneT eT aL., European Parliament (ed.), A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States, 2013; 
F. monéGer, Gestation pour autrui: Surrogate Motherhood, Paris, Société de Législation Comparée, 2011; recently e.g: S. 
SucKer, “To Recognize or Not to Recognize? That Is the Question!”, European Journal of Law Reform 2015 (17) 2, pp. 257-
270, 258 f. The author would like to thank stud. iur Florian Merker for his support and comments on the article.
2 BGH, 10 December 2014, Az. XII ZB 463/13, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2015, pp. 261-
267. Whenever this article mentions „Recitals“ without further indications it referes to the recitals of this decision.
3 See reports in fn. 1.
4 For an overview see for example S. GöSSL, “Germany“ in: P. Beaumont/K. Trimmings, International Surrogacy Arrange-
ments, Oxford, Hart, 2013, pp. 131-142 and S. SucKer, “To Recognize or Not to Recognize? That Is the Question!”, European 
Journal of Law Reform 2015 (17) 2, pp. 257-270. Violating public policy: AG Düsseldorf, November 2010 - not published; 
AG Frankfurt am Main 29 December 2010, Az. 49 XVI 108/08 – not published; AG Hamm 30 January 2011 Az. XVI? – not 
published. Dissenting opinions by some first instance courts such as: AG Neuss, 14 May 2013, Az. 45 F 74/13, Zeitschrift für 
das gesamte Familienrecht 2014, p. 1127; AG Friedberg, 01 March 2013, Az. 700 F 1142/12AG Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Familienrecht 2013, p. 1994.
5 It had been a twin pregnancy originally. One of the foetuses had not survived.
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as contrary to the public policy. A recognition of the mere parentage of the genetic father would have 
been possible6 but not the recognition of the “whole” judgment of paternity of both fathers.
6. The BGH decided that the judgment of paternity as a whole, that is regarding both father-
hoods, had to be recognized in Germany. He rejected a violation of the German public policy and based 
his decision mainly on the best interest and well-being of the child outweighing the policies of the forum 
to restrict surrogacy. Nevertheless, she limited that decision on (1) cases of recognition of foreign court 
decisions in which (2) the child is genetically linked to one of the parents.
III. The legal background
7. There are only few substantial law provisions regarding surrogacy (1.). Therefore, it is neces-
sary to read those provisions together with the general provisions regarding parentage (2.) and funda-
mental or human rights protected by German law (3.). This background has to be put in the cross-border 
context that is the treatment by private international law (4.) 
1. The German Substantial Law Regarding Surrogacy
8. The German regulation of surrogacy is limited to its criminal law aspects7 and neither ad-
dresses the intended parents nor the surrogate mother. Section 1 para. 1 no. 2, 6, 7 and para. 2 Embryo 
Protection Act (ESchG)8 prohibit the (medical) undertaking of surrogacy and the Adoption Placement 
Act (AdVermiG)9 prohibits commercial actions supporting surrogacy such as placement, advertisement 
of placement (sections 13c, 13d, 14b) and public search of parties (sec. 14a para. 1 no. 2 lit. c).10 Some 
further provisions in criminal and civil law disapprove undertakings in the context of surrogacy.11 
9. The German courts had extended these provisions to a general disapproval of surrogacy in the 
legal system.12 Furthermore, most courts derived from the criminal law provisions the mission to prevent 
further parents to undertake surrogacy abroad and thus circumvent the prohibition under German law. 
The denial of any rights for parents therefore also contained some general preventive thoughts. 
2. The German Substantial Law Regarding Parentage 
10.The German law distinguishes between the parentage of women and men. The differentiation 
is based on the biological difference that is the birth procedure.
6 Therefore, the child was a German national and a passport could be issued.
7 c. müLLer-GöTzmann, Artifizielle Reproduktion und gleichgeschlechtliche Elternschaft, Heidelberg, Berlin, Springer, 2009, 
pp. 235 seq.; J. TauPiTz en H.-L. Günther/J. Taupitz/P. Kaiser (ed.), Embryonenschutzgesetz, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 2008, p. 17.
8 Embryonenschutzgesetz of 13 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I 2746, amended 23 October 2001, Bundesgesetzblatt 
I 2702.
9 Gesetz über die Vermittlung der Annahme als Kind und über das Verbot der Vermittlung von Ersatzmüttern (Adoption-
svermittlungsgesetz) revised 22 December 2001, Bundesgesetzblatt 2001 I 354; amended by Art 8 Law 10 December 2008, 
Bundesgesetzblatt I 2403. The provisions about surrogacy (s 13a-14b) were introduced 1989, Gesetz zur Änderung des Adop-
tionsvermittlungsgesetzes, 27 November 1989, Bundesgesetzblatt 1989 I 2014.
10 m. coeSTer, ”Ersatzmutterschaft in Europa“ en H.-P. Mansel/T. Pfeiffer/H Kronke/C Kohler/R. Hausmann (ed.), Fest-
schrift für Erik Jayme, München, Sellier, 2004, pp. 1243-1258, 1245.
11 m. coeSTer, „Ersatzmutterschaft in Europa“ en H.-P. Mansel/T. Pfeiffer/H Kronke/C Kohler/R. Hausmann (ed.), Fest-
schrift für Erik Jayme, München, Sellier, 2004, pp. 1243-1258, 1245; H. GrziwoTz, “Beurkundungen im Kindschaftsrecht” en 
G. Brambring/H.U. Jerschke (ed.), Beck’sches Notar-Handbuch, 5th, München, C.H. Beck, 2009, p. 80; r. DeTTmeyer, Medizin 
& Recht. Rechtliche Sicherheit für den Arzt, 2nd, Heidelberg, Springer, 2006, p. 174.
12 No tax deductibility: FG München, 21 February 2000, Az. 16 V 5568/99, BeckRechtsprechung 2000, 30813399; FG 
Düsseldorf, 9 May 2003, Az. 18 K 7931/0, Deutsches Steuerrecht - Entscheidungsdienst 2003, p. 145; no health insurance: LG 
Köln, 4 July 2007, Az. 23 O 347/06, NJW Rechtsprechungs-Report 2008, p. 542; heterologous insemination is deductible as 
extraordinary financial burden as long as demarcation to illegal practices,’such as surrogacy’ remains clear: Niedersächsisches 
FG, 5 May 2010, Az. 9 K 231/07, Deutsches Steuerrecht - Entscheidungsdienst 2011, pp. 82-86; see also S. GöSSL, “Germany“ 
in: P. Beaumont/K. Trimmings, International Surrogacy Arrangements, Oxford, Hart, 2013, pp. 131-142.
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A) Motherhood
11. Sec. 1591 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code - BGB) defines “mother” as solely the per-
son giving birth. The rule was enacted to create a clear determination13 and to deter reproduction treat-
ments leading to ‘split’ motherhood.14 Motherhood is therefore not contestable or dispensable,15 even 
in the (more hypothetical) case of embryo implementation against the woman’s will.16 There is no co-
motherhood provision in German law. The birth alone creates a legally relevant relation between mother 
and child17.18 The only possibility to dissolve the bond between legal mother and child and create one 
between intended mother and child is by adoption.19 
B) Fatherhood
12. Legal fatherhood is regulated more liberally than motherhood. The mother’s husband is the 
father (sec. 1592 no. 1 BGB). If the mother is unmarried or the husband’s fatherhood has been contested 
successfully, legal father is who acknowledges paternity (sec. 1592 no. 2) or whose paternity has been 
judicially established (sec. 1592 no. 3).20 Whenever the child has a legal father, a contestation of pater-
nity is necessary to acknowledge a differing paternity, even in cases where the legal father obviously is 
not the genetic father.21 
13 B. ScHwarz, Die Verteilung der elterlichen Sorge aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, VS 
Verlag, 2011, p. 41; a. SPicKHoFF, “Der Streit um die Abstammung – Brennpunkte der Diskussion” in A. Spickhoff/D. Schwab/D. 
Henrich/P. Gottwald (ed.), Streit um die Abstammung – ein europäischer Vergleich, Bielefeld, Gieseking, 2007, pp. 13-71, 19; u. 
waniTzeK, Rechtliche Elternschaft bei medizinisch unterstützter Fortpflanzung, Bielefeld, Gieseking, 2002, p. 434.
14 Gesetzentwurf 13 June 1996 Bundestagsdrucksache 13/4899 82; Rechtsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages, Be-
schlussempfehlung und Bericht, 12 September 1997 Bundestagsdrucksache 13/8511 69; B. ScHwarz, Die Verteilung der el-
terlichen Sorge aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2011, p. 41; n. DeTHLoFF, 
“Leihmütter, Wunscheltern und ihre Kinder”, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 922-932, 923. The difference to the possibility of a 
‘split’ fatherhood, as caused by adoption or sperm donation, both also leading to ‘split’ parenthood, was explained by the birth 
procedure creating not only a social but also a special biological bond between child and birth mother which had to be protect-
ed, see e.g. a. eSer/H.-G. KocH, “Rechtsprobleme biomedinischer Fortschritte in vergleichender Perspektive” en Professors of 
Criminal Law Tübingen and Ministry of Justice Baden-Württemberg (ed.), Gedächtnisschrift für Rolf Keller, Tübingen, Mohr 
Siebeck, 2003, p. 19; m. KeTTner, “Neue Formen gespaltener Elternschaft”, B 27 Aus Politik und Weltgeschichte 2001, pp. 34-
38, 38; c. müLLer-GöTzmann, Artifizielle Reproduktion und gleichgeschlechtliche Elternschaft, Berlin, Springer, 2009, p. 248.
15 Gesetzentwurf 13 June 1996, Bundestagsdrucksache 13/4899 82; KG Berlin 19 March 1985, Az. 1 W 5729/84, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1985, p. 2201; r DeTTmeyer, Medizin & Recht. Rechtliche Sicherheit für den Arzt, 2nd, Heidelberg, 
Springer, 2006, p. 175; H. GrziwoTz, “Beurkundungen im Kindschaftsrecht”, en G. Brambring/H.U. Jerschke (ed.), Beck’sches 
Notar-Handbuch, 5th, München, C.H. Beck, 2009, recital 80; T. rauScHer, “§ 1591 BGB” en J. von Staudinger, Kommentar 
zum BGB, Vol. 4 Familienrecht, München, Sellier/de Gruyter, 2011, recital 16; B. ScHwarz, Die Verteilung der elterlichen 
Sorge aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2011, p. 41.
16 T. rauScHer, “§ 1591 BGB” in J. von Staudinger, Kommentar zum BGB, Vol. 4 Familienrecht, München, Sellier/de 
Gruyter, 2011, recital 18.
17 Exceptions: Sec. 1307 BGB (marriage between relatives) and Sec. 173 Strafgesetzbuch (incest), both referring to genetic 
relations; m. coeSTer, “Ersatzmutterschaft in Europa“, en H.-P. Mansel/T. Pfeiffer/H Kronke/C Kohler/R. Hausmann (ed.), 
Festschrift für Erik Jayme, München, Sellier, 2004, pp. 1243-1258, 1247; K. muScHeLer/ a. BLocH, “Das Recht auf Kenntnis 
der genetischen Abstammung und der Anspruch des Kindes gegen die Mutter auf Nennung des leiblichen Vaters“, Familie 
Partnerschaft Recht 2002, pp. 339-352, 340 f; T. rauScHer, “§ 1591 BGB” en J. von Staudinger, Kommentar zum BGB, Vol. 
4 Familienrecht, München, Sellier/de Gruyter, 2011, recital. 19; H. SeiDL, “Anfechtung bei der homologen und heterologen 
Insemination”, Familie Partnerschaft Recht 2002, pp. 402-404, 402.
18 J. GernHuBer/D. coeSTer-waLTJen, Familienrecht, 5th, München, C.H. Beck, 2006, p. 625; B. ScHwarz, Die Verteilung 
der elterlichen Sorge aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2011, p. 41.
19 VG Berlin, 5 September 2012, Az. 23 L 283.12, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2014, p. 80; J. 
GernHuBer/D. coeSTer-waLTJen, Familienrecht, 5th, München, C.H. Beck, 2006, p. 625; n. DeTHLoFF, “Leihmütter, Wunschel-
tern und ihre Kinder”, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 922-932, 923; T. rauScHer, “§ 1591 BGB” en J. von Staudinger, Kommentar 
zum BGB, Vol. 4 Familienrecht, München, Sellier/de Gruyter, 2011, recital 17; B. ScHwarz, Die Verteilung der elterlichen 
Sorge aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2011, p. 41.
20 E.g. J. GernHuBer/D. coeSTer-waLTJen, Familienrecht, 5th, München, C.H. Beck, 2006, p. 626; B. ScHwarz, Die 
Verteilung der elterlichen Sorge aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2011, p. 41.
21 E.g.: P. ecKerSBerGer, “Auswirkungen des Kinderrechteverbesserungsgesetzes auf Vereinbarungen über eine heterologe 
Insemination” Mitteilungen des Bayerischen Notarvereins 2002, p. 262; D. HaHn, “§ 1592” en H.G. Bamberger/H. Roth (ed.), 
Beck’scher Online-Kommentar BGB, München, C.H. Beck, 35th edition 01.05.2015 recital 3.
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C) Adoption
13. Through adoption, a child becomes the adoptive parents’ child under German substantive 
law (sec. 1754 BGB). The former parents lose all rights with respect to the child;22 therefore their con-
sent or a replacing judicial decision23 is required (sec. 1748 BGB).24 A promise to consent is against 
public policy and void.25 A spouse or same-sex partner can adopt the other spouse’s (natural or adopted) 
child to become the second parent (‘stepchild’ adoption or Stiefkindadoption or ‘successive’ adoption or 
Sukzessivadoption).
3. Fundamental Rights
14. In surrogacy cases the surrogate mother’s, the intended parents’ and the child’s fundamental 
rights become relevant, that is rights that are guaranteed to all humans and have to be protected from 
interventions of the State but also against third party interventions by the State. They derive basically 
from two sources: The Grundgesetz (Basic Law – GG) and international law, especially the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the UN-Convention on the Rights of Children. The two latter 
apply in an indirect way: Courts have to take international law obligations “into consideration” when 
applying and interpreting the national law.26 Thus, the ECHR influences the interpretation of the national 
law and especially the interpretation of the corresponding Basic Law’s fundamental rights.
A) Human Dignity (Surrogate Mother and Child)
15. As the most important fundamental right (or the source of all fundamental rights), the hu-
man dignity, Art. 1 para. 1 Basic Law27 protects every human from being de-humanized. There is no 
clear definition when this exactly is the case. As a general rule the human dignity has been violated in 
cases where the person gets deprived of her identity of a person and is treated as an object. The human 
dignity in “inviolable” that is once the right has been touched it is violated, and there is no possibility 
of justification. In cases of commercial surrogacy the surrogate mother “sells” the use of her body or 
womb. Therefore, some scholars and courts argue that the surrogate mother’s human dignity is always 
touched – and therefore violated – in cases of commercial surrogacy.28 Consequently, courts treated sur-
rogacy as illegal and a violation of the child’s and mother’s human dignity, reducing both to objects of 
(commercial) contracts.29
22 B. ScHwarz, Die Verteilung der elterlichen Sorge aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, 
VS Verlag, 2011, pp. 58 ff.
23 BVerfG, 27 April 2006, Az. 1 BvR 2866/04, Das Standesamt 2006, p. 322; B. ScHwarz, Die Verteilung der elterlichen 
Sorge aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2011, pp. 58 f.
24 B. ScHwarz, Die Verteilung der elterlichen Sorge aus erziehungswissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Wiesbaden, 
VS Verlag, 2011, p. 46.
25 m. coeSTer, “Ersatzmutterschaft in Europa“, en H.-P. Mansel/T. Pfeiffer/H Kronke/C Kohler/R. Hausmann (ed.), Fest-
schrift für Erik Jayme, München, Sellier, 2004, pp. 1243-1258, 1249; u. waniTzeK, Rechtliche Elternschaft bei medizinisch 
unterstützter Fortpflanzung, Bielefeld, Gieseking, 2002, p. 230.
26 E.g. BVerfG, 14. October 2004, Az. 2 BvR 1481/04, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2004, pp. 3407-3412 (Görgülü); 
BVerfG 4 May 2011, Az. 2 BvR 2365/09, 740/10, 2333/08, 1152/10, 571/10, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2011, pp. 1931-
1946 (Sicherungsverwahrung).
27 Art. 1 para 1 Basic Law: Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.
28 E.G. a. DieL, Leihmutterschaft und Reproduktionstourismus, Frankfurt a.M., Wolfgang Metzner, 2014, pp. 70 ff.
29 E.G. OLG Hamm, 7 April 1983, Az. 3 Ss OWi 2007/82, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1985, p. 2205; VGH Kassel, 23 
December 1987, Az. 11 TH 3526/871, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1988, p. 1281; undecided AG Gütersloh, 17 Dezember 
1985, Az. 5 XVI 7/85, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 1986 p. 718; KG Berlin, 19 March 1985, Az. 1 W 5729/84, 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1985, p. 2201. a. eSer/H.-G. KocH, “Rechtsprobleme biomedinischer Fortschritte in ver-
gleichender Perspektive” in Professors of Criminal Law Tübingen and Ministry of Justice Baden-Württemberg (ed.), Gedächt-
nisschrift für Rolf Keller, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2003, pp. 15, 24; m. KeTTner, “Neue Formen gespaltener Elternschaft”, B 
27 Aus Politik und Weltgeschichte, 2001, 34, 38; H.-G. KocH, “Fortpflanzungsmedizin im europäischen Rechtsvergleich” ibid 
44, 57; overview over the discussion: S. SucKer, “To Recognize or Not to Recognize? That Is the Question!”, European Journal 
of Law Reform 2015 (17) 2, pp. 257-270, 266.
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16. It has also been argued that the child (or the child’s existence) becomes “object” of a contract 
in cases of commercial surrogacy contracts.30 On the other hand, at the time of the conclusion of the 
agreement the child had not yet existed. Therefore, a major part of the scholars regards the child’s human 
dignity as not violated by the surrogacy agreement as such.31
B) Parentage and Family (Surrogate Mother and Intended Parents)
17. Art. 6 para. 2 Basic Law protects the right to be a parent. It protects the biological parents, 
and in case of a surrogate mother the special mother-child-relationship created by birth.32 
18. Besides, Art. 2 para. 1 and 6 para 1 Basic Law as well as Art. 8 para. 1 ECHR also protect 
the genetic and social parentage, or the intend to be parent, even in cases where the genetic parent is not 
the legal one or an intended parent has neither a genetic nor legal relationship to the child (yet), e.g. the 
intended father in cases of sperm donation.33
C) Family and Parentage (Child)
19. On a child’s side, Art. 2 para 1, Art. 6 para. 1 and 2 Basic Law also protect the right to have 
two parents that is two persons taking care of the child’s best interest as a family in a legal sense.34 Fur-
thermore, Art. 8 para. 1 ECHR and Art. 7 para. 1 UN-Convention on the Rights of Children also protect 
the right to found a legal child-parent-relationship.35 Both rights include the status allocation as legal 
parents,36 the recognition of a legal parent-child-relationship established abroad37 but also the right to 
have two actual parents taking care and responsibility.38 
D) Personality, Identity and Knowledge of the Origins (child)
20. Another important fundamental right protected by Art. 2 para. 1 Basic Law and Art. 8 para. 1 
ECHR is each child’s right to know his or her origins as a basis to a smooth development of the personal 
identity and consequently the personality. It is regarded as one special aspect of the general personal-
ity right (Art. 2 para 1, 1 para 1 Basic Law).39 In cases of surrogacy this right can be violated as the 
30 E.g.: F. STurm, “Dürfen Kinder ausländischer Leihmütter zu ihren genetischen Eltern nach Deutschland verbracht wer-
den?” in J.F. Baur/O. Sandrock/B. Scholtka/A. Shapira (ed.), Festschrift für Gunter Kühne, Frankfurt, Recht & Wirtschaft, 
2009, pp. 919-932, 924.
31 E.g.: c. STarcK, „Die künstliche Befruchtung beim Menschen – Zulässigkeit und zivilrechtliche Folgen – 1. Teilgutach-
ten: Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme, Gutachten A” en DJT (ed.), Verhandlungen des 56. Deutschen Juristentags, Teilband. 1 
Gutachten, München, C.H. Beck, 1986, Gutachten A, pp. 41 f., 56 f.; D. coeSTer-waLTJen, “Die künstliche Befruchtung beim 
Menschen – Zulässigkeit und zivilrechtliche Folgen – 2. Teilgutachten: Zivilrechtliche Probleme, Gutachten B”, ibid., Gutach-
ten B, p. 46. 
32 Doubting that e.g: D. KaiSer, Elternglück durch Fremdspende und Leihmutterschaft?, en I. Götz/I. Schwenzer/K. 
Seelmann/J. Taupitz (ed.), Festschrift für Gerd Brudermüller, München, C.H. Beck, 2014, pp. 357-370, 362; T. rauScHer, „§ 
1591 BGB“ en J. von Staudinger, Kommentar zum BGB, Vol. 4 Familienrecht, München, Sellier/de Gruyter, 2011, recital. 12.
33 E.G.: BGH recital 52; “Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur weiteren Verbesserung von Kinderrechten (Kinderrechteverbesse-
rungsgesetz - KindRVerbG)“, Bundestagsdrucksache vom 11.11.1999, 14/2096, p. 6.n. DeTHLoFF, “Leihmütter, Wunscheltern 
und ihre Kinder”, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 922-932, 927.
34 BVerfG, 19 Feburary 2013, Az. 1 BvL 1/11; 1 BvR 3247/09, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2013, p. 847, recital 44 seq. 
(Sukzessivadoption); G. BriTz, ”Das Grundrecht des Kindes auf staatliche Gewährleistung elterlicher Pflege und Erziehung – 
jüngere Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts“, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 1069-1074, 1071.
35 ECHR, 26 June 2014, no. 65192/11 (Mennesson vs. France) and no. 65941/11 (Labassee vs. France).
36 BVerfG, 17 December 2013, Az. 1 BvL 6/10, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2014, p. 1364 (behördliche Vaterschafts-
anfechtung).
37 G. BriTz, Das Grundrecht des Kindes auf staatliche Gewährleistung elterlicher Pflege und Erziehung – jüngere Recht-
sprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 1069-1074, 1071.
38 BVerfG, 19 Feburary 2013, Az. 1 BvL 1/11; 1 BvR 3247/09, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2013, p. 847, recital 44 f. 
(Sukzessivadoption).
39 E.G. n. DeTHLoFF, “Leihmütter, Wunscheltern und ihre Kinder”, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 922-932, 928.
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child will be deprived of the possibility to know the biological (surrogate) and the genetic (egg donor) 
mother:40 The birth registration in general only gives information about the legal parents, that is in case 
of recognition neither the genetic nor the surrogate mother. 
E) Right of Not Being Stateless (child)
21. Finally, from the personality right and Art. 2 para. 1, 1 para. 1 Basic Law in conjunction 
with Art. 7 para. 1 UN-Convention on the Rights of Children derives the right of each child to not be 
left stateless. This right could especially be violated in cases in which the intended parents were not 
recognized as such in their home country while the surrogate parents were not recognized as parents in 
theirs and both countries’ nationality laws followed the principle of ius sanguinis,41 as the German law 
basically does. The strict approach therefore had led to several cases of surrogate children left stateless 
whenever the law of the surrogate mother also followed the ius sanguinis-principle but allocated the 
parentage to the intended German parents. 
4. Cross-Border Questions
22. Parentage established abroad can be recognized in two ways: First, it can be recognized as 
a judgment if established by a judicial decision. In family law, relevant provision are sec. 108 f. Gesetz 
über das Verfahren in Familiensachen und in den Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit (Act 
on Proceedings in Family Matters and in Matters of Non-contentious Jurisdiction – FamFG). Secondly, 
it can be recognized if established lawfully under the law applicable according to the German Private 
International Law.
A) Scope of Sec. 108 Para. 1 FamFG – Recognition of a Foreign Judgment 
23. Sec. 108 FamFG applies to all foreign judgments except marital matters. They can be recog-
nized within other proceedings (incidentally), thus, no separate exequatur proceeding is necessary. The 
definition of “judgment” in the scope of sec. 108 para. 1 FamFG is understood broader than a “judg-
ment” under German law but there is no agreement about the exact definition. As a core agreement the 
provision includes all (non-marital) decisions, which are not only statements or repetitions of the facts 
and have been issued by a public authority following a formal proceeding. Legal scholarship had been 
split with respect to a judicial decision only stating the pre-existing legal situation, as the Californian 
surrogacy law had been regarded by some.42
B) Impediment to Recognition: Sec. 109 Para. 1 Lit. a: Jurisdiction of the Court
24. The recognition shall be refused when the courts of the other state do not have jurisdiction 
under German law (so-called “inverse competence” or “reflection principle”).43 German courts have 
jurisdiction in matters relating to parentage whenever the child, or one of the parents, or a man who 
wants to esablish parentage to a child because he had sexual relations with the mother during the time 
40 Recital 39, 42.
41 See High Court of Justice, Family Division, Case No: FD08P01466, Re: X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), [2008] EWHC 
3030 (Fam), Recital 10: “The children were marooned, stateless and parentless.“ 
42 For a recognition as a judgment: c. BenicKe, “Kollisionsrechtliche Probleme der Leihmutterschaft”, Das Standesamt 
2013, pp. 101-114, 104 f.; K. DuDen, “Ausländische Leihmütter: Elternschaft durch verfahrensrechtliche Anerkennung”, Das 
Standesamt 2014, pp. 164-170, 165 f.; against: a. DieL, Leihmutterschaft und Reproduktionstourismus, Frankfurt a.M., Wolf-
gang Metzner, 2014, p. 162; D. HenricH, “Das Kind mit zwei Mütter (und zwei Vätern) im Internationalen Privatrecht” en S. 
Hofer/D. Klippel/U. Walter (ed.), Festschrift für Dieter Schwab, Bielefeld, Gieseking, 2005, pp. 1141-1152, 1146 f. 
43 BGH, 30 March 2011, Az. XII ZB 300/10, NJW-Rechtsprechungs Report 2011, p. 721; w. Hau “109 FamFG” en H. 
Prütting/T. Helms (ed.), FamFG, 3rd, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, Recital 20; T. rauScHer, “109 FamFG” en T. Rauscher (ed.), 
Münchener Kommentar zum FamFG, 2nd, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, recital 11.
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of conception, is German, or one of these has his or her place of usual residence in Germany (sec. 100 
FamFG)44. 
25. There is a dispute whether “parent” also includes those whose parentage is still to be es-
tablished as long as they are not the man expressively mentioned in the provision.45 Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether a new-born can have a place of usual residence and how to determine it in cases where 
the parents still have to be determined.46 Also, the child’s citizenship in surrogacy cases can create a 
problem, as the German citizenship follows the ius sanguinis-principle that is derived from parentage 
which still have to be established. 
C) Impediment to Recognition: Sec. 109 Para. 1 Lit. d: ordre public 
26. The most important reason to refuse recognition is the violation of the national public policy 
(ordre public) that is when recognition of the judgment in the concrete case would lead to a result that 
is ”obviously incompatible with significant principles of German law“, in particular incompatible with 
constitutional fundamental rights (sec. 109 para. 1 lit. d FamFG). 
27. In contrast to the public policy exception as provided in the rules of conflict of laws in Art. 
6 Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (Introductory Act to the Civil Code – EGBGB), the 
public policy exception in the foreign judgment recognition rule is applied less strictly. Even though 
Art. 6 EGBGB already states that the application of a foreign rule can only be refused in exceptional 
circumstances, the recognition of foreign judgments requires an even more restrictive approach. Recog-
nition can only be refused in very rare, very exceptional circumstances. Reason for that generosity is the 
purpose of sec. 109 FamFG to avoid „limping“ status especially in family law. Furthermore, the respect 
and trust into the functioning of a foreign jurisdiction requires to assume that the decision had been made 
lawfully and had respected the parties‘ rights.47
28. In the aforementioned court decisions the general disapproval of surrogacy in the German 
legal system had usually been extended to the international level. The majority of the decisions refused 
the recognition of a foreign parentage allocation to the intended parents as violation of the public policy.48 
D) Determination of the Law Applicable on Parentage
29. Whenever there is no judgment to recognize on questions of legal and genetic49 parent-
age, the law applicable has to be determined by Art. 19 para. 1 EGBGB. There are three equally 
44 Section 100 Matters Relating to Parentage
German courts shall have jurisdiction when the child, the mother, the father, or the man who has made a declaration in lieu 
of an oath that he and the mother had sexual relations during the time of conception:
1. is German or 2. has his place of usual residence in Germany.
45 T. rauScHer, “100 FamFG” en T. Rauscher (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum FamFG, 2nd, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, 
recital 10 f. 
46 B. Heiderhoff, “Der gewöhnliche Aufenthalt von Säuglingen“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 
2012, pp. 523-526, 525; T. Helms, „Art. 19 EGBGB” en F.J. Säcker/R. Rixecker (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerli-
chen Gesetzbuch Vol 10, 6th, München C.H. Beck, 2015, recital 8, both with further references.
47 BGH: recital 28 f. with further references, in a different context for example: BGH, 21 April 1998 - XI ZR 377/97, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1998, pp. 2358-2360, 2358; BGH, 26 August 2009, Az. XII ZB 169/07, Neue Juristische Wochen-
schrift 2009, pp. 3306-3310, 3306; BVerwG, 29 November 2012, Az. 10 C 4.12; 10 C 5.12; 10 C 11.12; 10 C 14.12, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2013, pp. 427-431, 428 seq.; BGH, 4 June 1992, Az. IX ZR 149/91, Neue Juristische Wochen-
schrift 1992, pp. 3096-3106, 3098; w. Hau “109 FamFG” en H. Prütting/T. Helms (ed.), FamFG, 3rd, München, C.H. Beck, 
2013, recital 45; c. mayer, Ordre public und Anerkennung der rechtlichen Elternschaft in internationalen Leihmutterschafts-
fällen, RabelsZ 78 (2014), pp. 551-591, 571 f.; r. waGner, “Abstammungsfragen bei Leihmutterschaften in internationalen 
Sachverhalten“, Das Standesamt 2012, pp. 294-300, 296.
48 Recently again: KG Berlin 1 August 2013, Az. 1 W 413/12, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 
2014, p. 72.
49 r. HePTinG “Die Feststellung der Abstammung” en R. Hepting/B. Gaaz (ed.), Personenstandsrecht Vol 2, Frankfurt a.M., 
Verlag für Standesamtswesen, 2006, part IV-273.
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relevant50 connecting factors: The law of the child’s place of habitual residence (1), in relation to 
each parent the nationality of said parent (2) and in case of the mother’s marriage the law applicable 
to the marriage (3). To determine the habitual residence of a newborn the slidely prevailing view in 
doctrine applies the mother’s habitual residence, that is the person who gave birth, nevertheless the 
question is disputed.51 In case of contradictory results of the alternative connection factors the law 
best for the child in the concrete case applies. That is the law leading most efficiently and quickly to 
a clear parental situation.52 The prevailing opinion applies a renvoi according to Art. 4 para. 1 phrase 
1 EGBGB as long as it does not reduce Art. 19’s alternatives of connecting factors. In the latter case 
renvoi is excluded.53 In questions of surrogacy a part of the German literature applies only alternatives 
supporting the motherhood of the person giving birth.54
30. Furthermore, the law determined in that way must not be contrary to the national public 
policy, Art. 6 EGBGB. Its wording corresponds to the wording of sec. 109 para. 1 lit. d FamFG, nev-
ertheless the ordre public is regarded as applying more strictly. In contrast to sec. 109 FamFG it is not 
secured that another court already checked the legality of the proceedings and issues. A violation of the 
fundamental rights of people involved or also the protection of the policies of the state can lead to the 
50 E.g.: BGH, 3 May 2006, Az. XII ZR 195/03; openJur 2011, 9737, recital 15; BGH, 23 November 2011, Az. XII ZR 
78/11, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 2012, p. 616 recital 20; BayObLG, 11 January 2002, Az. 1Z BR 51/01, Zeit-
schrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 2002, p. 686; OLG Karlsruhe, 2 February 2015, Az. 11 Wx 65/14, openJur 2015, 9010 
recital 22; S. GöSSL, “Germany“ en: P. Beaumont/K. Trimmings (ed.), International Surrogacy Agreements. Oxford, Hart, 
2013, pp. 131-142, 139; T. HeLmS, „Art. 19 EGBGB“ en F.J. Säcker/R. Rixecker (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerli-
chen Gesetzbuch Vol 10, 6th, München C.H. Beck, 2015, recital 12; D. HenricH, „Das Kind mit zwei Mütter (und zwei Vätern) 
im Internationalen Privatrecht“ en S. Hofer/D. Klippel/U. Walter (ed.), Festschrift für Dieter Schwab, Bielefeld, Gieseking, 
2005, pp. 1141-1152, 1145; H. KLinKHarDT „Art. 19 EGBGB“ en F.J. Säcker/R. Rixecker (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch Vol 10, 5th, München, C.H. Beck, 2010, recital 14; c. mayer, Ordre public und Anerkennung der 
rechtlichen Elternschaft in internationalen Leihmutterschaftsfällen, RabelsZ 78 (2014), pp. 551-591, 579; against m. anDrae, 
Internationales Familienrecht, 3rd, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2014, § 5 recital 27, 33-35; n. DeTHLoFF, Konkurrenz von Vater-
schaftsvermutung und Anerkennung der Vaterschaft, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2005, pp. 326-
330, 329 f.; G. KeGeL/K. ScHuriG, Internationales Privatrecht, 9th, München, C.H. Beck, 2004, § 20 X 2.
51 VG Berlin, 26 November 2009, Az. 11 L 396.09 Vdoc, 11 L 396/09, BeckRechtsprechung 2009 42145; r. HePTinG “Die 
Feststellung der Abstammung” en R. Hepting/B. Gaaz (ed.), Personenstandsrecht Vol 2, Frankfurt a.M., Verlag für Standesa-
mtswesen, 2006, part IV-169. First applying law of claimed mother’s nationality: D. HenricH, “Das Kind mit zwei Mütter (und 
zwei Vätern) im Internationalen Privatrecht” en S. Hofer/D. Klippel/U. Walter (ed.), Festschrift für Dieter Schwab, Bielefeld, 
Gieseking, 2005, pp. 1141-1152, 1146. Against: Fachausschuss-Nr 3579, 18/19 May 2000’ (2000) Das Standesamt 310 f: law 
of the State where the child was supposed to live.
52 E.g. AG Karlsruhe, 14 June 2007 Az. UR III 26/07, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2008, p. 
549; D. HenricH, “Das Kind mit zwei Mütter (und zwei Vätern) im Internationalen Privatrecht” en S. Hofer/D. Klippel/U. 
Walter (ed.), Festschrift für Dieter Schwab, Bielefeld, Gieseking, 2005, pp. 1141-1152, 1148 f.; iDem “Art. 19 EGBGB” in J 
von Staudinger, Kommentar zum BGB, EGBGB/IPR, Berlin, Sellier/de Gruyter, 2008, recital 78; H. KLinKHarDT “Art. 19 EG-
BGB” en F.J. Säcker/R. Rixecker (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch Vol 10, 5th, München C.H. Beck, 
2010, recital 14; F. STurm, “Dürfen Kinder ausländischer Leihmütter zu ihren genetischen Eltern nach Deutschland verbracht 
werden?” in J.F. Baur/O. Sandrock/B. Scholtka/A. Shapira (ed.), Festschrift für Gunter Kühne, Frankfurt, Recht & Wirtschaft, 
2009, pp. 919-932, 920 seq.; against r. HePTinG “Konkurrierende Vaterschaften in Auslandsfällen” Das Standesamt 2000, pp. 
33-36, 35: law of the probable biological father.
53 E.g. OLG Nürnberg, 25 April 2005, Az. 7 WF 350/05, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 2005, p. 1697; B. 
HeiDerHoFF “Art. 19 EGBGB” en H.G. Bamberger/H. Roth (ed.), Beck’scher Online-Kommentar BGB, , München, C.H. Beck, 
35th edition 01.05.2015, recital 20; H. KLinKHarDT “Art. 19 EGBGB” en F.J. Säcker/R. Rixecker (ed.), Münchener Kommentar 
zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch Vol 10, 5th, München C.H. Beck, 2010, recital 23; T. rauScHer “Vaterschaft auf Grund Ehe mit 
der Mutter” Familie Partnerschaft Recht 2002, pp. 352, 356; against D. HenricH “Kollisionsrechtliche Fragen bei medizinisch 
assistierter Zeugung” en T. Helms/J.M. Zeppernick (ed.), Lebendiges Familienrecht: Festschrift für Rainer Frank, Frankfurt 
a.M., Verlag für Standesamtswesen, 2008, pp. 249-259, 254; F. STurm, “Dürfen Kinder ausländischer Leihmütter zu ihren 
genetischen Eltern nach Deutschland verbracht werden?” in J.F. Baur/O. Sandrock/B. Scholtka/A. Shapira (ed.), Festschrift für 
Gunter Kühne, Frankfurt, Recht & Wirtschaft, 2009, pp. 919-932, 920 fn. 9; FacHauSScHuSS Der STanDeSBeamTen, Fachauss-
chuss-Nr 3579, 18/19 May 2000, Das Standesamt 2000, pp. 310-311.
54 r. HePTinG “Die Feststellung der Abstammung” en R. Hepting/B. Gaaz (ed.), Personenstandsrecht Vol 2, Frankfurt 
a.M., Verlag für Standesamtswesen, 2006, part IV-281 seq.; H. KLinKHarDT “Art. 19 EGBGB” en F.J. Säcker/R. Rixecker (ed.), 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch Vol 10, 5th, München C.H. Beck, 2010, recital 14; D. LooScHeLDerS 
“Alternative und sukzessive Anwendung mehrerer Rechtsordnungen nach dem neuen internationalen Kindschaftsrecht” Praxis 
des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 1999, pp. 420-424, 423; F. weDemann, Konkurrierende Vaterschaften und 
doppelte Mutterschaft im Internationalen Abstammungsrecht, München, Nomos, 2006, pp. 141 ff.
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application of the provision. Therefore, the application of foreign law to a surrogacy case had been re-
fused in Germany in cases where one person involved was German but left Germany to circumvent the 
prohibition of surrogacy (fraus legis) and the social parent-child relation had not yet been established.55
IV. The Decision
31. The BGH decided several of the aforementioned controversial issues. The main part of the 
judgment concentrated on the analysis of the public policy violation balancing the different policies and 
interests against each other.
1. Applicability of Sec. 108 Para. 1 FamFG
32. As the parentage in question was based on the Californian “judgment of paternity” the first 
question was whether this judgment was a “judgment” in the sense of sections 108 FamFG and there-
fore the provisions regarding the recognition of foreign judgments applicable. The BGH decided that 
a deep analysis of the legal consequences of the judgment of paternity was not necessary: A decision 
only stating the legal facts could be recognized as well, as long as it was guaranteed that a national court 
scrutinized the facts and the validity of the surrogacy agreement and the decision had at least some legal 
consequences.56 As the judgment of paternity according to sec. 796f lit. f para 2 California Family Code 
at least influenced the child’s status and there had been an analysis of the facts and the legal validity of 
the agreement, the BGH came to the first conclusion that sec. 108 FamFG was applicable.57 
2. “Inverse” Jurisdiction of the Californian Court (Sec. 109 Para. 1 Lit. a)
33.  Regarding the “inverse” jurisdiction of the court, the BGH avoided a discussion of the 
disputed questions, especially whether a new-born could have a place of usual residence and how to 
determine it in cases where the parents still have to be determined. She argued that at least the surrogate 
mother (that is the legal mother from the point of view of the German substantial law) had her habitual 
residence in California.58 That connecting point sufficed to establish jurisdiction of the Californian Court 
from the point of view of sec. 109 para. 1 lit. a FamFG.
3. The Public Policy Analysis in Detail
34. The BGH confirmed the earlier jurisprudence which applied the ordre public within sec. 109 
para. 1 lit. d FamFG in a very restrictive way.59 Nevertheless, she did not follow the earlier courts much 
further. The court undertook a very careful reasoning and weighing of the interests, rights and policies 
involved. Fundamental rights in question had to be considered from the surrogate parents’ part, the in-
tended parents’ part and the child’s part and could primarily be derived from the German Basic Law and 
55 E.g. VG Berlin, 5 September 2012, Az. 23 L 283.12, 5.9.2012, Az. 23 L 283.12, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und 
Verfahrensrechts 2014, p. 80; OLG Nürnberg, 25 April 2005, Az. 7 WF 350/05, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 
2005, p. 1697; H. KLinKHarDT “Art. 19 EGBGB” en F.J. Säcker/R. Rixecker (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch Vol 10, 5th, München C.H. Beck, 2010, recital 23; T rauScHer “Vaterschaft auf Grund Ehe mit der Mutter”, Familie 
Partnerschaft Recht 2002, pp. 352-359, 356; against D. HenricH “Kollisionsrechtliche Fragen bei medizinisch assistierter Zeu-
gung” en T. Helms/J.M. Zeppernick (ed.), Lebendiges Familienrecht: Festschrift für Rainer Frank, Frankfurt a.M., Verlag für 
Standesamtswesen, 2008, pp. 249-259, 254; F. STurm, “Dürfen Kinder ausländischer Leihmütter zu ihren genetischen Eltern 
nach Deutschland verbracht werden?” in J.F. Baur/O. Sandrock/B. Scholtka/A. Shapira (ed.), Festschrift für Gunter Kühne, 
Frankfurt, Recht & Wirtschaft, 2009, pp. 919-932, 920 fn. 9; FacHauSScHuSS Der STanDeSBeamTen, Fachausschuss-Nr 3579, 
18/19 May 2000, Das Standesamt 2000, pp. 310-311.




59 Recital 28 f.
SuSanne L. GöSSL The recognition of a “judgment of paternity”…
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2015), Vol. 7, Nº 2, pp. 448-465
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt
458
international law, as the latter can specify and direct the interpretation of the further.60 He came to the 
conclusion that in this concrete case the recognition of the judgment of paternity would not violate the 
fundamental principles of German law in an unacceptable way. Decisive element was the best interest 
of the child.61 
35. The BGH started the analysis with the clarification that a general public policy violation 
could not be assumed in all cases involving surrogacy, and at least not in cases where one of the two 
intended parents was the genetic father.62 
36. She further refused the application of any general preventive elements of the prohitions of 
surrogacy. The criminal provisions were enacted to protect the child and the surrogate mother against 
psychological and physical damages by the birth procedure and the later “split” motherhood,63 not to de-
terrent one of the two. The child was created by a circumvention of the criminal law but nevertheless not 
responsible for its circumvention. In difference to the prevention of surrogacy before, the child’s addi-
tional rights had to be considered as well. As the child should not be held responsible, general deterrent 
elements could not apply against the child’s best interest, at least not within the ordre public exception.64 
Furthermore, the criminal law provisions prohibiting the undertaking of surrogacy were limited on sur-
rogacy within the German territory, therefore its general preventive elements as well.65
37. The analysis had to be divided into the recognition of fatherhood of each intended parent, 
as one of the two partners was the genetic father. The recognition of his paternity did not create any 
problems: The surrogate mother was unmarried, so there was no presumption of a possible husband’ 
paternity which had to be contested and she did not object to the genetic father’s paternity. Therefore, 
the genetic father could also have recognized the parenthood under German law.66 
38. To the contrary, the fatherhood of the second intended father required a more careful analy-
sis. The German law asumes that every person has a mother and her motherhood can only be dissolved 
by adoption.67 A part of German court decisions and scholarly literature had come to the conclusion that 
(at least) the parenthood of the genetic father’s partner would violate the public policy per se.68
60 Recital 40; in general to the indirect application of international law, especially the ECHR e.g. BVerfG, 14. October 
2004, Az. 2 BvR 1481/04, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2004, pp. 3407-3412 (Görgülü); BVerfG 4 May 2011, Az. 2 BvR 
2365/09, 740/10, 2333/08, 1152/10, 571/10, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2011, pp. 1931-1946 (Sicherungsverwahrung).
61 Recital 44. 
62 Recital 34.
63 Recital 39.
64 Recital 45-46; n. DeTHLoFF, “Leihmütter, Wunscheltern und ihre Kinder”, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 922-932, 931; c. 
mayer, Ordre public und Anerkennung der rechtlichen Elternschaft in internationalen Leihmutterschaftsfällen, RabelsZ 78 
(2014), pp. 551-591, 573.
65 Recital 45-46.
66 Recitals 30 f.; similar already AG Nürnberg, 14 December 2009, Az. UR III 0264/09, UR III 264/09 1, Zeitschrift für 
das gesamte Familienrecht 2014, p. 1127. 
67 Recital 35; see already recital 11 of this document with more references.
68 E.g. VG Berlin, 26 November 2009, Az. 11 L 396.09 Vdoc, 11 L 396/09, BeckRechtsprechung 2009 42145; Fach-
ausschuss der Standesbeamten, Fachausschuss-Nr 3579, 18/19 May 2000 (2000) Das Standesamt 2000, pp. 310-311; J. L. 
BacKmann, Künstliche Fortpflanzung und Internationales Privatrecht, München, C.H. Beck, 2002, pp. 128 f.; c. BenicKe, 
„Kollisionsrechtliche Fragen der Leihmutterschaft“, Das Standesamt 2013, pp. 101-114, 111; m. enGeL, “Internationale Leih-
mutterschaft und Kindeswohl”, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 2014, pp. 538-561, 558; n. wiTzLeB, “’Vater werden 
ist nicht schwer?’” en N. Witzleb/R. Ellger/P. Mankowski/ H. Merkt/O. Remien (ed.), Festschrift für Dieter Martiny, Tübingen, 
Mohr Siebeck, 2014, pp. 203-240, 234; against e.g. AG Friedberg, 1 March 2013, Az. 700 F 1142/12AG Zeitschrift für das 
gesamte Familienrecht 2013, p. 1994; AG Neuss, 14 May 2013, Az. 45 F 74/13, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 
2014, p. 1127; F. STurm, “Dürfen Kinder ausländischer Leihmütter zu ihren genetischen Eltern nach Deutschland verbracht 
werden?” in J.F. Baur/O. Sandrock/B. Scholtka/A. Shapira (ed.), Festschrift für Gunter Kühne, Frankfurt, Recht & Wirtschaft, 
2009, pp. 919-932, 931 f.; n. DeTHLoFF, “Leihmütter, Wunscheltern und ihre Kinder”, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 922-932, 926; 
c. mayer, Ordre public und Anerkennung der rechtlichen Elternschaft in internationalen Leihmutterschaftsfällen, RabelsZ 78 
(2014), pp. 551-591, 570 f.
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A) Surrogate Mother
39. As the surrogate mother’s fundamental rights in question the BGH considered her human 
dignityand the protection of her right to be the child’s mother.69 The BGH refused a human dignity viola-
tion very briefly: It could only be relevant in cases where she did not act voluntarily either at the under-
taking of surrogacy or at the rejection of motherhood,70 or said rejection did not occur in a lawful way.71 
40. Furthermore, the BGH did not regard the surrogate mother’s right to be a parent (Art. 6 para. 
2 Basic Law) as preponderant. The surrogate mother had given up her position voluntarily by her dec-
laration against the Californian Court.72 The possibility to dissolve the special mother-child-relationship 
and the corresponding responsibility is known under German law in cases other than surrogacy (adop-
tion and anonymous birth). So, the concept does not violate the German public policy per se.73 Again, 
the court argued that the surrogate mother’s rights could only be violated in a public policy relevant 
way in cases where she did not want to give up her motherhood or hand over the child voluntarily.74 As 
a woman under German law can dissolve the legal bound between herself and her child by agreement 
to adoption or anonymous birth, the possibility to dissolve the bound by declaration against the court 
neither violated the public policy per se.75
41. As the surrogacy agreement, its execution and the determination of parentage had happened 
under the eyes and control of a court in a lawful proceeding, the BGH saw it as guaranteed that the he 
full consensus of all parties involved had been secured.76 Thus, the surrogate mother’s rights and posi-
tions in question did not speak against a recognition of the judgment of paternity.
B) Intended Parents
42. On the other hand, the intended parents’ rights spoke in favour of a recognition.77 Their 
rights to be parents and create and maintain a family were protected by Art. 2 para. 1 and 6 para 1 Basic 
Law as well as Art. 8 para. 1 ECHR.78
43. Irrelevant did the Court consider the fact that they were two fathers that is a homosexual 
couple instead of a heteosexual, a point which has been disputed by some scholars.79 The constellation of 
same-sex parenthood is recognized by the German law in cases of adoption80 and cases of transsexuality 
(gender reassignment after becoming parent)81.82 Furthermore, the Court confirmed the already estab-
69 Recital 39, 41.
70 Recital 39, 41.
71 Recital 51; an analysis of these issues also is indicated in BVerfG, 22 August 2012, Az. 1 BvR 573/12, NJW-Rechtspre-
chungs Report 2013, p. 1 recital 15. In this case the Constitutional Court rejected a complaint against the non-recognition of the 
intended parent’s parenthood in a surrogacy case for formal reasons and therefore did not decide on the issue, but the BVerfG 
mentioned that a complaint needed at least more information on the person and the consent of the surrogate mother and the 
circumstances of the conclusion the surrogacy agreement.
72 Recital 47 seq.
73 Recital 50.
74 Recital 49; a. BernarD, “Samenspender, Leihmütter, Retortenbabies: Neue Reproduktionstechnologien und die Ord-




78 n. DeTHLoFF, “Leihmütter, Wunscheltern und ihre Kinder”, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 922-932, 927.
79 Regarding a homosexual parenthood as “alien” or “foreign” to the German law’s nature (wesensfremd): n. wiTzLeB, 
“’Vater werden ist nicht schwer?’” en N. Witzleb/R. Ellger/P. Mankowski/ H. Merkt/O. Remien (ed.), Festschrift für Dieter 
Martiny, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2014, pp. 203-240, 234.
80 BVerfG, 19 Feburary 2013, Az. 1 BvL 1/11; 1 BvR 3247/09, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2013, p. 847 (Sukzessiva-
doption).
81 BVerfG, 27 May 2008, Az. 1 BvL 10/05 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2008, p. 3117 (Geschlechtsumwandlung ver-
heirateter Transsexueller); OLG Köln, 30 November 2009, Az. 16 Wx 94/09, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2010, p. 1295.
82 Recital 36.
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lished judicial option that child care and eduation by a same-sex couple does not differ from the one by 
a hetero-sex couple.83 Finally, the court did consider as irrelevant the fact that the second intended father 
was not genetically related to the child, as this constellation is also recognized for the indented father of 
a hetero-sex couples under German law in cases of sperm donation.84
C) Child
44. The BGH mentioned a possible violation of the child’s human dignity very briefly. She 
refered to the part of the literature which excludes such a violation, as the existence of the child and 
therefore the existence of his or her human dignity derives from the surrogacy agreement which there-
fore cannot violate it.85 
45. The Court confirmed several times that the German law is obliged to the child’s best inter-
est, as provided in Art. 3 para. 1 UN Convention on the Rights of Childen, Art. 24 para. 2 European 
Charta of Human Rights, Art. 8 ECHR and – last but not least – Art. 2 para 1., Art. 6 para. 2 Basic Law.86 
Nevertheless, the recognition of a foreign decision is supposed to avoid a révision au fond. Thus, the 
BGH explicitely stated that an analysis which parentage allocation finally would be best comply with the 
child’s best interest was not possible87, at least not in cases in which the surrogate mother is not geneti-
cally related to the child, one of the intended parents on the other hand is.88
46. Afterwards, the court focussed on a possible violation of the child’s personality rights.89 One 
crucial aspect is the right to have two, not only one, legally allocated parents. The refusal of a recogni-
tion of the judgment would abolish an already established parentage relationship and therefore touch 
that right.90 The recognition of one fatherhood would not suffice, as the rights guaranteeing parentage 
always refer to two parents.91 Furthermore, a “limping” motherhood would not suffice, neither. There 
was the possibility to establish the motherhood of the surrogate mother by German law, as one of the 
alternatives of Art. 19 EGBGB would have led to the application of German substantial law and the 
establishment of the motherhood of the person giving birth. Nevertheless, this motherhood would not 
be recognized under the Californian law that is the law of the mother herself. It therefore did not cre-
ate a “whole” motherhood as required by the ECHR, but only a “limping” one. On the other hand, the 
recognition of the judgment would give the child two parents present and eager to serve as caring and 
responsible parents in a social and legal way.92. A rejection of the recognition of fatherhood therefore 
83 Recital 43; BVerfG, 19 Feburary 2013, Az. 1 BvL 1/11; 1 BvR 3247/09, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2013, p. 847, 
recital 80 (Sukzessivadoption).
84 Recital 52; “Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur weiteren Verbesserung von Kinderrechten (Kinderrechteverbesserungsgesetz - 
KindRVerbG)“, Bundestagsdrucksache vom 11.11.1999, 14/2096, p.6.
85 c. STarcK, “Die künstliche Befruchtung beim Menschen – Zulässigkeit und zivilrechtliche Folgen – 1. Teilgutachten: 
Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme, Gutachten A” en DJT (ed.), Verhandlungen des 56. Deutschen Juristentags, Teilband. 1 Gut-
achten, München, C.H. Beck, 1986, Gutachten A, pp. 41 f., 56 f. D. coeSTer-waLTJen, “Die künstliche Befruchtung beim Men-
schen – Zulässigkeit und zivilrechtliche Folgen – 2. Teilgutachten: Zivilrechtliche Probleme, Gutachten B”, ibid., Gutachten B, 





90 See the same reasoning in case of contestation of fatherhood: BVerfG, 17 December 2013, Az. 1 BvL 6/10, Neue Juristi-
sche Wochenschrift 2014, p. 1364 recital 102 ff. (behördliche Vaterschaftsanfechtung); BVerfG, 19 Feburary 2013, Az. 1 BvL 
1/11; 1 BvR 3247/09, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2013, p. 847 recital 44 f. (Sukzessivadoption); G. BriTz, Das Grundrecht 
des Kindes auf staatliche Gewährleistung elterlicher Pflege und Erziehung – jüngere Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 1069-1074, 1071.
91 Recital 54-56; BVerfG, 19 Feburary 2013, Az. 1 BvL 1/11; 1 BvR 3247/09, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2013, p. 
847 recital 44 f. (Sukzessivadoption); J. GernHuBer/D. coeSTer-waLTJen, Familienrecht, 6th, München, C.H. Beck, 2010, § 48 
Recital 9.
92 Recital 55, 56; n. DeTHLoFF, “Leihmütter, Wunscheltern und ihre Kinder”, Juristenzeitung 2014, pp. 922-932, 931; F. 
STurm, “Dürfen Kinder ausländischer Leihmütter zu ihren genetischen Eltern nach Deutschland verbracht werden?” in J.F. Baur/O. 
Sandrock/B. Scholtka/A. Shapira (ed.), Festschrift für Gunter Kühne, Frankfurt, Recht & Wirtschaft, 2009, pp. 919-932, 931 f.
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would violate the child’s right to establish a parent-child-relationship as guaranteed by Art. 8 ECHR 
(part of private life to find and have an identity within the national society).93
47. Finally, the BGH compared the case of surrogacy with its alternative under German law, 
adoption.94 It would result in the same situation that is the intented parents as the legal parents estab-
lished. Nevertheless the beginning of a new adoption proceeding contained the risk that one of the in-
tended parents would change his mind. Furthermore, the court acknowledged an additional responsibil-
ity of the intended parents to care for the child, as they initiated the surrogacy procedure and therefore 
caused all the problems the child finally had to face. This situation differed from the situation of an 
adoption where the child was already existent in the time the intended parents opted for an adoption. 
This reasoning also spoke in favour of a recognition of the parenthood as compared to the solution to not 
recognize it and open the way to an adoption.95
48. Finally, very briefly, the BGH mentioned the child’s right to know his or her origins. The 
court did not consider this right as relevant here, as the question involved only the registration of civil 
status. The civil status registry did not have the mission to give information about the genetic or biologi-
cal identity but only about the legal parentage.96
4. Result
49. As a result, the BGH recognized the parenthood of both intended fathers and allowed the 
registration of both as legal parents in the civil registry. Nevertheless, he explicitly limited the decision 
to cases of the recognition of a foreign decision and to cases where at least one of the intended parents 
was genetically related to the child, the surrogate mother was not and the latter furthermore did not make 
any claims regarding the child.
V. Analysis and Outlook
50. The decision created a certain security that at least some cases of surrogacy obtained abroad 
will not lead to an unbearable situation for the child as it had happened in several decisions earlier, left 
parentless and stateless or ending in an orphanage.97 Furthermore, the BGH changed the point of view 
on the situation by her focus not on the situation of the parents or the public policy reasons to prohibit 
surrogacy, but on the best interest of the child. As the child is usually the person suffering most, and the 
one who is not responsible for the situation, this focus was necessary and sometimes not as clear in ear-
lier decisions and literature. Nevertheless, the BGH did not abolish all the uncertainty about the national 
treatment of surrogacy undertaken abroad, as he limited the decision explicitely to only some cases of 
surrogacy. The questions she left open will be described in the following paragraphs.
1. The Human Dignity
51. The BGH avoided a deeper analysis of a violation of the child’s or the surrogate mother’s 
human dignity. The reason is of political nature: The Court wanted to recognize the judgment. On the 
other hand, a deeper analysis of the human dignity might have prevented this, as it can be regarded as 
a legal one way street: The human dignity in “inviolable” that is once the right has been touched it is 
violated, and there is no possibility of justification. 
93 Recital 42, referring to ECHR, 26 June 2014, no. 65192/11 (Mennesson vs. France) and no. 65941/11 (Labassee vs. 
France).
94 Recital 57-60, refererring to BVerfG, 19 Feburary 2013, Az. 1 BvL 1/11; 1 BvR 3247/09, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
2013, p. 847 recital 44 f. (Sukzessivadoption); ECHR, 26 June 2014, no. 65192/11 (Mennesson vs. France) and ECHR, 28 June 
2007, no. 76240/01 (Wagner and J.M.W.L. vs. Luxembourg).
95 Recital 57-60.
96 Recital 63.
97 E.G. VG Berlin, 26 November 2009, Az. 11 L 396/09, BeckRechtsprechung 2009, 42145.
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52. In cases of commercial surrogacy the existence of the child, birth circumstances, and parent-
age are the object of a commercial contract. Furthermore, the human dignity already starts (and grows) 
with the first act of creation, so it is hard to argue that the child’s human dignity has not at least been in 
question for a bit when after birth in execution of the contract it was handed over.98 It might have been 
worth a deeper discussion whether this handing over might not constitute an act where the (now exist-
ent) child was object of a commercial contract. 
53. Additionally, in such a contract the surrogate mother “sells” the use of her body or womb. 
The BGH argued that she agreed on the procedure and therefore her dignity had not been violated. On 
the other hand, there are some judicial decisions arguing that the human dignity does not depend on the 
agreement of its owner as it contains a core element of being a human which is not dispensable.99 There-
fore it would at least be worth the consideration that not only the child’s but also the mother’s human 
dignity had been touched in cases of commercial surrogacy.
54. The BGH might have argued, nevertheless, that the human dignity in the concrete case was 
not touched. In the analysis of the ordre public usually a violation requires a significant connection to 
the national (German) law system (Inlandsbezug).100 The selling of the body happened in California 
where the German Constitution is of no relevance and the surrogate mother was also from California. 
Therefore the recognition of a different concept of human dignity might have been acceptable from the 
point of view of the ordre public. 
2. Open Questions Regarding Cross-border Surrogacy
55. The BGH limited the decision explicitely to only few cases of surrogacy. The questions she 
left open will be described in the following.
A) Recognition of Motherhood
56. The BGH did not take position in the question what would have happened if the intended 
parents had been man and women or two women. The German law does not know the concept of rec-
ognition of motherhood (as it does of fatherhood). It only can be established by birth or adoption. So, 
the argument that the genetic father could have established his paternity under German law equally is 
not transferable on the case of a genetically related intended mother (in case of egg transplantation).101 
However, the German law does recognize the concept of recognition of maternity abroad, as Germany 
is a member state of the Convention relative à l’établissement de la filiation maternelle des enfants na-
turels.102 So, as the legal concept is not absolutely unknown to the German (private international) law, 
the recognition of a “judgment of maternity” by a foreign court should be recognized as well, at least in 
cases where the intended mother is genetically related. 
 
98 See e.g. F. STurm, “Dürfen Kinder ausländischer Leihmütter zu ihren genetischen Eltern nach Deutschland verbracht 
werden?” in J.F. Baur/O. Sandrock/B. Scholtka/A. Shapira (ed.), Festschrift für Gunter Kühne, Frankfurt, Recht & Wirtschaft, 
2009, pp. 919-932, 924. Different opinion: c. mayer, „Verfahrensrechtliche Anerkennung einer ausländischen Abstammungs-
entscheidung zugunsten eingetragener Lebenspartner im Fall der Leihmutterschaft“, Das Standesamt 2015, pp. 33-40, 36 f., 
argueing that the contract was aimed at carrying the child and not at the result to create the child. 
99 E.g.: BVerfG, 21 June 1977, Az. 1 BvL 14/76, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1977, pp. 1525 f., recitals 151, 153; 
BVerwG, 15 December 1981, Az. 1 C 232.79, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1982, p. 664 (Peep-Shows); VG Neustadt, 21 
May1992, Az. 7 L 1271/92.NW, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1993, p. 98 (Zwergenweitwurf).
100 E.g. regarding sec. 109 FamFG: T. rauScHer, “109 FamFG” en T. Rauscher (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum FamFG, 
2nd, München, C.H. Beck, 2013, recital 37; OLG Naumburg, 6 September 2013, Az. 2 Wx 20/12, BeckRechtsprechung 2014, 
02904; in general e.g.: J. von Hein, Art. 6 EGBGB en F.J. Säcker/R. Rixecker (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch Vol 10, 6th, München C.H. Beck, 2015, recital 184-196 with further references. 
101 See for that case VG Berlin, 5 September 2012, Az. 23 L 283.12, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahren-
srechts 2014, p. 80.
102 CIEC-Convention No. 6, signed at Brussels 12 June 1962.
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57. Additionally, the BGH’s argument the parenthood could have been established by adoption 
as well but with disadvantages for the child can be applied also on cases of two women or a hetero-sex 
couple as intended parents. Thus, most probably a judgment of paternity in the two cases described 
above would also be recognized under sec. 108-109 FamFG.
B) Married Surrogate Mother
58. Furthermore, the BGH explicitely avoided the question whether the recognition of the ge-
netic father’s fatherhood – and therefore one part of the judgment of paternity – would have been as 
easy been recognized in cases of a married surrogate mother. A man can only recognize fatherhood of a 
child born by a married woman after contestation of her husband’s fatherhood within a limited period of 
time. In some cases German courts for that reason had rejected the recognition of the genetically related 
father’s paternity. Nevertheless, as the decision speaks for a more generous approach regarding the rec-
ognition of court decisions establishing parents without a révision au fond, most probably a recognition 
of the parentage without an earlier contestation of the surrogate mother’s husband would be accepted 
as well.103
C) Non-genetically Related Intended Parents
59. The BGH explicitely limited the decision on the case that one of the intended parents was 
also genetically related to the child.104 So the question arises how she would treat a case without a ge-
netic relationship. One could conclude that then a recognition could not be possible.105 On the one hand, 
this argument is weak in cases where the surrogate mother is not married, as under German law every 
man can recognize parenthood of an unmarried woman’s child unless she does not consent to his father-
hood.106 On the other hand, even in cases of a married surrogate mother the abovementioned reasoning 
would apply as well: The decision clearly indicates a generous approach without a révision au fond in 
cases of a foreign judicial decision. The recognition of fatherhood under German law would be possible 
without a proof of a genetic relationship.107 A contestation of the surrogate mother’s husband’s paternity 
would not have been required. Thus, most probably a judgment of paternity will also be recognized in 
cases of non-related intended parents as long as the surrogate mother is not genetically related, neither, 
and consents to the handing over of the child.
D) Genetically Related Motherhood
60. More difficult seems the situation that the surrogate mother is genetically related to the 
child.108 The BGH mentioned explicitely that she did not want to decide this issue. Nevertheless, apply-
ing his reasoning on the case of a genetically related surrogate mother, the situation should not be differ-
ent from the one decided by the court: The German family law does not distinguish between genetic and 
biological motherhood, as it is supposed to be always the same. The Basic Law protects both equally, 
genetic and biological parentage. Besides, the BGH drew a parallel to adoption law and argued that the 
103 Similar: D. HenricH, „Leihmütterkinder: Wessen Kinder?“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 
2015, pp. 229-233, 231.
104 Recital 53. 
105 See D. HenricH, “Leihmütterkinder: Wessen Kinder?“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2015, pp. 
229-233, 233; c. mayer, „Verfahrensrechtliche Anerkennung einer ausländischen Abstammungsentscheidung zugunsten einge-
tragener Lebenspartner im Fall der Leihmutterschaft“, Das Standesamt 2015, pp. 33-40, 40; F. zwiSSLer, “Anerkennung einer 
kalifornischen Entscheidung zur Elternstellung bei Leihmutterschaft“, Neue Zeitschrift für Familienrecht 2015, pp. 118-119, 119.
106 There had been the competence of a public authority to contest the fatherhood but this competence had been declared 
as unconstitutional in 2013, see BVerfG, 17 December 2013, Az. 1 BvL 6/10, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2014, p. 1364 
(behördliche Vaterschaftsanfechtung).
107 E.G. S. SucKer, “To Recognize or Not to Recognize? That Is the Question!”, European Journal of Law Reform 2015 
(17) 2, pp. 257-270, 261; e. woiTGe, “Der Status von Kindern ausländischer Leihmütter in Deutschland”, Juristische Ausbil-
dung 2015, pp. 496–505, 503.
108 Recital 53.
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German law also knows the possibility to deny motherhood in cases of adoption and in cases of anony-
mous birth. Both possibilities are open to genetic and biological mother. So, as the biological mother’s 
rights only can outweight the best interest of the child and the intended parents’ parentage rights in cases 
in which the surrogate mother does not agree to the handing over of the child, the same should apply in 
cases of biological and genetical motherhood. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether courts will follow 
this reasoning. The rule allocating motherhood to the person giving birth (sec. 1591 BGB) is sometimes 
regarded as mandatory,109 so it might not also prevail in within the analysis of the ordre public.
E) Dispute between Intended and Surrogate Mother
61. Most probably in cases where the intended parents and the surrogate mother have a dispute 
about the child, the interests of the surrogate mother will outweight those of the intended parents. From 
the point of view of the German legal system, she is automatically the biological and legal mother 
and therefore has two reasons to claim the right to be a parent. Furthermore, the BGH expressed very 
strongly the opinion that the recognition of the judgment of paternity depended mainly on the fact that 
she agreed to hand over the child and rejected all her rights as a parent.110 Furthermore, her human dig-
nity will probably come into play in cases of an execution of the surrogacy agreement against her will.111 
F) No Judgment of Paternity
62. The most crucial open question is how the BGH would decide the same case without a judi-
cial decision.112 Art. 19 EGBGB would apply the law which would establish parentage in the best inter-
est of the child.113 As seen, the BGH regards a “limping” parentage as not equal to an actual parentage 
and also takes into account the willingness of the potential parents to actually take care and responsibil-
ity for the child. This would speak in favor of a connecting factor supporting the intended parentage. 
Nevertheless, the application of said legal system would have to pass the obstacle of ordre public, Art. 6 
EGBGB, which is to be applied more strictly than within the recognition of a foreign decision. 
63. It is difficult to foresee how a court would decide that issue. Most of the arguments the BGH 
used to weight the different interests of child, intended parents and surrogate mother could be applied 
in the same way. Nevertheless, the BGH explicitely mentioned the higher burden of Art. 6 EGBGB and 
furthermore the possibility of international mandatory law, probably referring to sec. 1591 BGB (mother 
is the woman giving birth) which sometimes is regarded as mandatory.114 The situation usually will be 
the same that is two intended parents willing to care and be parents on the one hand and a surrogate 
mother on the other hand who is far away and not willig to take any parental responsibility. So, it is to 
hope that most courts will come to the same conclusion as the BGH in this case: The best interest of the 
child is the one issue that matters most.
109 Unclear, but tendency: VG Köln, 20 February 2013, Az. 10 K 6710/11, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2013, p. 2617; 
see also S. SucKer, “To Recognize or Not to Recognize? That Is the Question!”, European Journal of Law Reform 2015 (17) 
2, pp. 257-270, 267; e. woiTGe, “Der Status von Kindern ausländischer Leihmütter in Deutschland”, Juristische Ausbildung 
2015, pp. 496–505, 500.
110  See also prevention of such a dispute as intention of the legislator prohibiting surrogacy: Gesetzentwurf der Bundesr-
egierung, “Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetzes“, Bundestagesdrucksache vom 09.03.89 
11/4154, pp. 6 f.
111 Different opinion: D. HenricH, „Leihmütterkinder: Wessen Kinder?“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfah-
rensrechts 2015, pp. 229-233, 233, not in cases where the child had lived with the intended parents against the surrogate 
mother’s will for several years. 
112 B. HeiDerHoFF, “Anmerkung“, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2015, p. 485; D. HenricH, “Leihmütterkinder: Wessen 
Kinder?“, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2015, pp. 229-233, 231 f.; T. HeLmS, “Abstammung nach in 
Kalifornien durchgeführter Leihmutterschaft“, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 2015, 245-246, 246. 
113 See recital 29 of this document.
114 Unclear, but tendency: VG Köln, 20 February 2013, Az. 10 K 6710/11, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2013, p. 2617; 
see also S. SucKer, “To Recognize or Not to Recognize? That Is the Question!”, European Journal of Law Reform 2015 (17) 
2, pp. 257-270, 267; e. woiTGe, “Der Status von Kindern ausländischer Leihmütter in Deutschland”, Juristische Ausbildung 
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G) Right to know the origins
64. Finally, one problem remains unresolved: The protection of the child’s right to know his 
or her origins. The recognition of the judgment leads to a record in the civil status registry that both 
intended parents are the legal parents. If the child wants to know who her or his (biological or genetic) 
mother is, she or he depends on the goodwill of the two intended parents to tell. To protect the right, 
some countries established national registries for e.g. sperm donations115 or – as in the case of Germany 
– obligations of medical clinics to keep the information regarding sperm donors.116 In cross-border cases 
the protection of the right will depend on the possibilities offered by the State of the undertaking, not 
of the German law. One possibility de lege ferenda to mitigate that problem would be the establishment 
of a more general data registry,117 maybe on an international level. De lege lata the civil status registry 
could also serve the purpose insofar as the registrar could add additional data not having legal conse-
quences but providing further information. The BGH briefly mentioned that possibility and declared the 
civil status registry as not the feasible place to do so. Even though she is right in the sense that the civil 
status registry traditionally had been established for other reasons,118 that is not longer true for questions 
of limping status: In other contexts, several courts have made the civil registrars add information to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of German citizens in cases of “limping” status, e.g. to maintain the right on 
a constitutionally protected “limping” marriage which was only valid outside of Germany but lived and 
therefore protected in Germany.119 An extension of that practice on cases of “limping” parentage would 
have been a legally already established possibility to protect the child’s rights to know the origins.120 
3. Outlook
65. The decision left the aforementioned questions explicitely open. Nevertheless, the decision 
shows a very clear tendency that is to focus on the child’s best interest and not the State’s policies to 
prohibit surrogacy.121 Hopefully, other courts will follow that line when confronted with the still open 
questions.
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118 D. BaLzer, “Die genetische Vaterschaft im Familien-, Familienverfahrens- und Personenstandsrecht“, Das Standesamt 
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